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IN THE SUPREME COU$1 .. ~IU
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~\tED
EDWARD L. G ILLMOI. EDjlJr " '2 l95A
\V .t\llD LESLIE GILLMOR and
--------------:··--0

~~e l!~~~~~~l~ ~i~c~~~J~·&it·s·., "': ·c~urr. Ut•
Jl ANY, formerly known as Island
Improvement Company,

Plaintiffs and Respondents_,

Case N 0 •
9993

vs.

EL\VOOD B. CARTER dba SERVICE SALT COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from a Summary Judgment of the District Court of
Salt Lake County, Bon. A. B. Ellett, District Judge

ALLEN H. TIBBALS
315 East 2nd South St.

WILLIAM H. HENDERSON
711 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant

Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GIL r~ ~ r oR, ED\r~\ltD LESI~IE GILLMOR and
c. l·,ltt\XCIS GILLMOR, JR. and
the ISL11\XI> 1{"\.NCHING COM-

I·~ D '', ~ \ 1t I>

1

J.

'r.

I>,\ N
fortnerly known as Island
ln1provc1nent Cotnpany,
\Case No.
Jlfainlifl's and Respondents~ I 9993

vs.
~~~IJ\\'()()D ll. CAR'l,ER dba
ICJ.~ S.L\ 1_/f COMPANY,

SERV-

Defendant and Appellant.

I

J

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The appellant respectfully petitions for a rehearing
in the aboYe matter for the follo"ring reasons:

TilE DE(;ISION OF THE COURT IS
t·XIX'l'}:LLI(;I\BLE IN THE LIGHT OF
THE RECORD AND POINT UPON WHICH
APPELLANT RELIED UPON APPEAL. THE
1.
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COUR'l" ENTIRELY MISCONSTRUED 'fHE
ISSUES IN,TOL VED IN THIS CAUSE.
(a) The Supreme Court~s Misconception of the

Issues in This Cause.
Here is how the Supreme Court misconstrued the
issues and then proceeded to try the case upon affidavits
and deposition on this incorrect issue.
The Supreme Court conceived plaintiff's issue to
be that he had acquired a prescriptive right by person·
ally using the road in controversy for over 30 years:
"He [appellant) also averred that he had ac·
quired a prescriptive right by using said road
openly and freely for a period of over 30 years."
- (P. I, para. 2, Opinion).
Appellant's personal use of the road for the prescriptive period was not the issue as we hereinafter
show.
The Supreme Court then observed from appellant's
deposition, that appellant had only used the road for
the purpose of hauling salt personally only a year and
a half before the commencent of this suit:
"His [appellant's) use of the road for the purpose of hauling salt, however, commenced ap·
proximately only a year and a half before the
commencement of this suit."
- (P. I, para. 3, Opinion).
The court then proceeds to rule that because appel·
lant admitted he had only used the road personally to
2
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haul salt for ouly a year and a half, he couldn't have
u'e< l it for ao years, and obtained a prescriptive right:
( P. :! , para. 4) .
.. By appellant's O\Vll admission i~ his deposition he had used the road for hauhng salt only
a pproxitna te ly one and one-half years before
this nl't ion \Vas started. He therefore could not
hn ,.e acquired a prescriptive right for the use of
the road for such purpose."
'rhis is all ,·ery fine, but this was not the issue.
Pluintitl. did not claim his prescriptive right to use the
road to haul salt \\'as by virtue of only his personal use
ot' the road for 30 years. Appellant's claim was the
State of Utah, owner of the leased land had, by virtue
of appellant's use of the road to haul salt, together with
the use of the road for this purpose by appellant's predel'l'ssors (prior lessees) the State of Utah, lessor, had
ncquired a prescriptiYe right to haul salt from said state
salt lnnds \vhich appellant leased from the State of
l Ttah, all as appears in Point 2 following.
·)

'fHE ISSUES WHICH PLAINTIFF

l{j.~LIED lrPON IN THIS CAUSE AND THE

POIX'f lTI>()N 'VHICH APPELLANT RELIED lTP()X ON '"fHIS APPEAL.
I>lnintiff did not base his right to haul salt upon
the road solely upon his own use of the road for such
purpose, because he had only personally used the road
for that purpose for more than a year and a half or so .
. \ppellant's claitn 'vas that appellant and his predeces-
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sors in interest had together obtained a prescriptive
right to use the road. Thus the pleadings were,
"Continuously and for a period of more than
30 years prior thereto, the defendant and his
predecessors in interest had used freely and
openly and without restraint,"
the road in controversy. (See page 5, Brief of appellant).
Briefly, the situation is this: Appellant leases salt
lands from the State of Utah for his salt business. The
road in controversy is the road which has been used to
haul salt from these lands. Appellant claims there is
an easement to use this road for the hauling of the salt
appurtenant to the land that appellant leases from the
state. The claim is that the easement was established
by the state's use of the road to reach its salt lands and
by adverse use of this road by state lessees from at lea.Jt
1939 until 1962, a period of over 20 years. The State
also used this road to reach State Lands and its use was
not limited and restricted.
Appellant found it difficult to obtain affidavits
from people, who for various reasons do not wish to
become involved in the controversy. (P. 11, Brief). It
has been said :
"Hear one side and you are in the dark. Hear
both sides and all will be clear."
But the affidavits which appellant did file (pages
93 to 105 of the record) show these leases-and the
Thomas affidavit specifically show adverse and open
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usc heginning 193U. (Sec l)oint II, page 13-1~, appel-

ltult's Brief').
'rhc hn\· is r lear. 1 \.ppellant claims an easement a ppurtcnant to the salt lands he leased from the State of
L~ tuh acquired hy use of the road in controversy by the
state.· and hy lessees of the state who hauled salt from
the state salt lands. Such an easement would be appurtenant to the lands. As is stated in 17 (a} Am. J ur.
Prud .. page 7;):L 7:3~3. sec. 149:
"..{ \ n appurtenant ease1nent is incident to an

est ale in land and passes to said lands."

*

*

*

*

.. :\lon.·oyer. it is inunaterial whether the land
is ronveyed for a tern1 of years, for life or in fee."
l t is also well established that the landlord may
ucquire an easc1nent by adverse use over the land of a
third person by tenants, and that successive adverse
uses may be tacked:

''Adverse use of an easement over the land
of a third person by a tenant under his lease inures to the benefit of the landlord so as to support
t!te ~~~tter's right to such easement by prescdiption. - ( :~:! 1\.1n. J ur. P. ~4, Sec. 20) .

*

*

*

*

···racking users - ,-fhe rule generally followed
in n1ost .iurisdictions is that to make up the period
requi1·ed for the acquisition of a prescriptive easement, successive adverse users by different persons tnay be tacked if there is privity between
sueh persons. Thus the adverse use of an easeInent over the land of a third person by a tenant
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under his lease inures to the benefit of the landlord so as to support the latter's right to such
easement by prescription.''-17 Am. Jur. P. 696,
Sec. 81).
As the easement acquired was appurtenant to the
salt lands of the state, the appellant herein as lesse of
these salt lands, had the right to use this easement. 'fhe
facts are not complete, but the issue was squarely met.
Plaintiff claims a right to use the road by his use and
by use of his predecessors in interest. He produces
affidavits further framing this issue. The case should
11ot be tried on these affidavits or on deposition. It
should be tried!
3. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT
ADJUDGE THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC ROAD
ON RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVITS AND APPELLANT'S DEPOSITION.
Appellant feels it should mention one other point.
Plaintiff pleaded the issue that the road was dedicated
to public use (page 5, appellant' Brief). Appellant
did not file affidavits on this issue, deeming it could
stand on this issue without the necessity of filing affidavits as this court ruled a party may stand, in Christense1t vs. Financial Service Co.~ 377 P (2d) 1010, (page
12, appellant's Opening Brief). This issue involved
records and testimony of public officials. Such an issue
shouldn't be tried by affidavit. Further, it would have
been idle because the lower court ruled that because
Salt Lake County had filed an action to declare the
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rond a puhl il' road. then 'vithout trial, dismissed it by
stipulation \vith prejudice. no other action could ever
ht· filed. 'l'his court did not review the District Court
ruling. It tried the issue of public road on the deposition ot' appellant \vhose knowledge was limited, then
· gn ve l'onclusiYe weight on the affidavits of respondent
und then l'iting a case 'vhich "·as tried on the merits and
n·hich \\'t' certainly don't quarrel with (Morris vs. Blunt_,
.f.9 lTt. ~4B. 1(10 )lac. 1127, page ~) rendered this decision on the Inerits.

CO~l~LUSION
i. \

ppellant respectfully submits:

It' this case is to be tried and judgment rendered
by this court on the pleadings, depositions and affidavits
(seep. :!, para. 3, Opinion), despite the decision of this
court in (,hristcnsen 1.~s. Financial Service Co._, supra,
then at least it should be tried on the issue that was
pleaded anti relied upon by appellant.
If a party 1nay not stand upon his pleadings as appellunt reads the case of Christensen vs. Financial S ervict' (,u., supra. to hold, this court should say so.

It' indiYid uuls not parties to a suit, are forever
bound because a county files a complaint to declare a
road a public road and then, without trial, stipulates
to dis1niss it 'vith prejudice, then we respectfully submit,the rourt should so rule.
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Dated: June 11, 1964.
Respectfully submitted,
William H. Henderson
711 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant.
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